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Abstract 
The present paper examines the relationship between Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP), using both accounting-based (Return on Assets 
and Return on Capital) and market-based (Excess Stock Returns) performance indicators. We 
use Bloomberg’s Environmental Social Governance (ESG) Disclosure score covering the 
S&P500 firms in the period 2007-2011 which allows for the examination of both linear and 
nonlinear relationships to be considered. The results of the linear model suggest that there is a 
significant negative relationship between CSP and Return on Capital. However, the non 
linear models provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between CSP and the accounting-
based measures of CFP, suggesting that in the longer run CSP effects are positive. Most 
prominent among our results is that fact that by disentangling the ESG Disclosure score into 
its environmental, social and governance sub-components, we find that a U-shaped 
relationship exists only between the governance sub-component and CFP. A straightforward 
implication of our findings suggests that in order for CSR to serve the interests of the 
shareholders, a long-run planning and considerable resources should be dedicated at this 
direction, given that CSR expenditure pays off only after a threshold of CSP has been 
reached. Furthermore, the fact that governance is the key driver affecting the CSP-CFP 
relationship suggests that CSR investments should be directed to this component. 
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1. Introduction 
The business case for corporate social responsibility, "a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their 
interaction with their stakeholders on voluntary basis" (European Commission, 2001, p.6) is 
debated extensively in academia and board rooms as a highly relevant topic, particularly in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis. “In recent years business increasingly has been viewed 
as a major cause of social, environmental, and economic problems. Companies are widely 
perceived to be prospering at the expense of the broader community.” (Porter and Kramer, 
2011, p.4). Hence, authorities, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and consumers 
have called for a more responsible and sustainable way of doing business. However, the 
decisive question that has to be answered for shareholders in a business context is whether 
CSR serves a company’s financial performance.  
Recent literature appears to be rather inconclusive with respect to the question of 
whether corporate social responsibility performance (CSP) can be translated in positive 
corporate financial performance (CFP). While a positive consensus seems to appear 
(Margolis et al., 2009), yet, this consensus is still fragile, since a range of recent studies 
support for either negative (Mittal et al., 2008) or mixed results (Schreck, 2011). Most 
research in this field heavily relies on the dataset provided by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini 
(KLD) (see, inter alia, Andersen and Dejoy, 2011; Jiao, 2010; Callan and Thomas, 2009; 
Brammer et al., 2009; Becchetti and Ciciretti; 2006; Hillman and Keim, 2001; McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2000). Yet, according to Margolis et al., (2009) alternative measures CSR 
performance should also be considered in the literature.  
Furthermore, most research making use of the KLD dataset only test for a linear 
relationship between a firm’s corporate social performance and its financial performance. 
However, recent developments in microeconomic theory rather suggest a non-linear set up 
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(see for instance; Manasakis et al., 2013, 2014; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzis, 2009). A 
non-linear relationship between CSP and CFP is therefore in line with economic intuition, but 
has rarely been tested at all (see, for instance, Barnett and Salomon, 2012, 2006). As in 
Barnett and Salomon (2012, 2006) we consider that those firms which voluntarily engage in 
more socially responsible activities incur higher corresponding costs, therefore firms with 
higher CSP score in the index have invested more financial resources in CSR comparing to 
those firms with lower CSP. 
  In addition, measuring corporate social responsibility has proven to be quite difficult 
since it is a multidimensional concept covering a whole set of different areas (Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). Those areas range from stakeholder management issues (such as employees’ 
working conditions) and environmental concerns up to patronage of arts and culture. As firms 
tend to use CSR as a means for public relations they often apply a very broad definition of 
CSR. Hence, alternatives to KLD third-party auditors’ data set need also to be considered in 
order to assess whether the current results of the literature are robust to different datasets. 
  Given these gaps in the literature, the main contributions of the present paper can be 
described succinctly. First, motivated by the works of Barnett and Salomon (2012, 2006), we 
examine both the linear and non-linear relationship between CSP and CFP, yet under the 
context of a new dataset, namely Bloomberg’s Environmental Social Governance (ESG) 
Disclosure score. Bloomberg’s score covers the S&P500 firms for the period 2007-2011 and 
serves as a proxy for actual CSR performance. The ESG score has the benefit of being easily 
transformable into a quadratic score. Second, we extend this line of research by disentangling 
the ESG Disclosure score into its three components so that we can identify the key driver of 
CFP. In particular, we disentangle the ESG Disclosure score into environmental, social and 
governance sub-components. Third, this study examines the effects of CSP on CFP using 
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both accounting-based (Return on Assets, Return on Capital) and market-based (Excess 
Stock Returns) performance indicators, for robustness purposes.  
In short, our results of the linear model suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between CSP and CFP, although this is significant only in the case of the Return on Capital. 
However, when a non-linear model is used, we find evidence of a U-shaped relationship 
between CFP and the accounting-based measures of CFP, i.e. Return on Assets and Return on 
Capital. The results do not allow us to report any significant relationship between CSP on 
market-based CFP, i.e. Excess Stock Returns. This U-shaped relationship confirms the 
findings by Barnett and Salomon (2012), who were the first to establish such a relationship 
by using a normalised version of the KLD dataset. This finding implies that CSR engagement 
does not pay off immediately, but only after a crucial point of CSR investment is crossed. 
While in the beginning additional CSR engagement affects profitability negatively, this effect 
reverses at some point and ultimately serves a company’s profitability.  
Most prominent among our findings is the fact that disentangling the ESG score into 
its sub-components, we find that only governance exhibits a significant U-shaped relationship 
with CFP. By contrast, no significant relationships can be reported for environmental and 
social sub-components. This finding has not been previously reported and adds on the 
discussion regarding the Stakeholder Influence Capacity (SIC) as introduced by Barnett 
(2007). SIC suggests that stakeholders will only perceive some of the firms as credible CSR 
actors and therefore reward them for their activities. Our results propose that CSR activities 
related to improvements in governance will initiate stakeholders’ positive reaction to the 
firm’s CSR activities. This is in line with a recent strand of the literature that suggests that 
governance related CSR by firms acts as a credible commitment of firms towards CSR. 
Therefore, it may boost the positive demand effects from the socially conscious consumers 
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and in turn the financial performance of the firm (See for instance, Lambertini, L. and 
Tampieri, 2015; Becchetti et al. 2014; Manasakis et al., 2014; Kopel and Brand, 2012). 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
and Section 3 presents the data and the panel regression model. Section 4 analyses the effects 
of Corporate Social Performance on Corporate Financial Performance, before Section 5 
concludes the study.  
 
2. Review of the relevant literature 
The theoretical discussion of good corporate citizenship has evolved tremendously 
since Milton Friedman’s famous and outright rejection of CSR in 1970. Friedman argued that 
“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits“ (p. 1) and that appointed 
managers have no right to spend shareholders’ money for other purposes than maximizing 
shareholder return. In fact, agency theory suggests that insiders, i.e. managers, have 
incentives to over-invest in CSR to increase their personal reputation (Barnea and Rubin, 
2010). This line of thought (shift of focus hypothesis) suggests that increasing CSR 
expenditure will lead to deteriorating profits as managers are distracted from their main 
objective. 
Yet, the theoretical framework suggested by Friedman is not conclusively supported 
by theory or by empirical evidence. A lot of convincing arguments have been made of how a 
good CSR performance as a strategic investment could eventually translate into higher profits 
and thus higher shareholder value. Jensen calls this idea “enlightened value maximization” 
(2001, p. 308) and stresses that a firm‘s value development should be regarded as the single 
criterion to assess the management‘s success. Nonetheless, he acknowledges that taking into 
account different stakeholders interests may be a legitimate and effective means to achieve 
this objective. This kind of “strategic CSR” is consistent with the strategy chosen by a profit-
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maximizing firm (Baron, 2001, p. 9). In fact, this idea is an advanced version of the original 
stakeholder theory as proposed by Freeman (1984). However, strategic investments with 
respect to CSR have the power to influence the competitive context of a company in a 
favorable way (Porter and Kramer, 2002, p. 61). Examples of such investments are: 
managing risk and reputation, human resource management, better access to finance, cost 
savings due to efficiency improvements and avoiding regulation (see, Reinhardt et al., 2008; 
Cochran, 2007; Heal, 2005; Greening and Turban, 2000, among others). In line with the 
above we introduce the assumption of  Barnett and Salomon (2012, 2006)  considering that  
firms with higher CSP score in the index have invested more financial resources in CSR 
comparing to those firms with lower CSP. 
Given the above, Russo and Fouts (1997) have identified CSR as a source of 
competitive advantage in accordance with the resource based view of the firm. According to 
this theory, firms need to possess resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and 
not substitutable in order to create a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
McWilliams and Siegel (2011) argue that some of the CSR investments outlined above, 
namely brand reputation, human capital (including top management) and the easier 
availability of finance, are exactly such resources and are created by CSR measures. Hence, 
engaging in corporate social responsibility issues could be a worthwhile consideration for a 
firm‘s management.  
Although the body of empirical literature on the CSP-CFP link is vast, it remains 
inconclusive. There are studies reporting positive, negative as well as neutral relationships 
between CSP and CFP (Fernandez-FeijooSouto, 2009). More recently a fragile consensus 
seems to emerge. Recent meta-analysis of 167 studies from 1972 to 2007 conducted by 
Margolis et al. (2009) suggests that there is a positive effect of CSR on accounting-based as 
well as market-based profits. However, despite this overall trend, there remains a range of 
7 
recent literature finding either negative (Mittal et al., 2008) or mixed results (Schreck, 2011). 
McWilliams et al. (2006) trace inconclusive results back to rather technical causes claiming 
that diverging empirical results may be due to inconsistencies in the definition of the 
dependent and independent variables, different samples or poor research design. In fact, 
many studies rely on similar data and a similar measure of corporate social performance, 
namely the KLD indicator (Margolis et. al, 2009). Apparently, this has consequences for the 
research design as well and most analysis has been only linear so far. 
Baron (2001) argues for better taking into account the kind of CSR a firm engages in. 
While strategic CSR investments are likely to have a positive impact on profitability, 
altruistic CSR may have the reverse effect. Hillman and Keim (2001) tested this argument 
empirically by subdividing corporate social performance into stakeholder management and 
social issues. This division follows Baron‘s (2001) definition of “strategic” and “altruistic” 
CSR. Regressing those two variables against the shareholder wealth creation, they find 
opposing effects. More specifically, they find that while stakeholder management is 
positively correlated with shareholder wealth creation, engagement in social issues has 
negative effects. The authors argue that those opposing effects “may partially explain why 
aggregating the two together into a measure of corporate social performance may lead to 
ambiguous results” (Hillman and Keim, 2001, p. 136). However, as McWilliams and Siegel 
point out (2011), although this distinction is elegant in theory, in practice it is usually hard to 
account for. This is because composite index numbers often aggregate different kinds of CSR 
activities into one single score. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has affected the business environment and society’s 
expectations regarding the relationship of business and society markedly. Whether this had an 
impact on the link between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance 
has been rarely tested. Again, two competing effects are conceivable. On the one hand, there 
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is reason to assume that the demand of socially responsible manufactured goods (or CSR as a 
product attribute) is income elastic. Portney (2008) argues that the shape of the 
“Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC) gives some evidence for this notion. The key idea is 
that people care more about environmental issues in line with rising income. The same is 
likely to hold true for CSR. Assuming that CSR has a positive income elasticity (i.e. being a 
normal good) or even an income elasticity greater than one (i.e. being a luxury good), in 
times of recession and declining real income, the demand for CSR goods (or goods and 
services with CSR attributes) should go down. At the same time, companies facing declining 
sales and profits feel the need to slash their budgets. In times companies lay off staff, cut 
back on benefits and pension schemes discretionary expenditure such as CSR spending 
would be an easy target. Indeed, The Economist (2009) reports that non-strategic CSR 
spending such as corporate philanthropy is often among the first expenditure items to be 
ceased. 
 The role of governance is also important. Poor corporate governance, i.e. a lack of 
corporate social responsibility, is widely regarded as one of the key sources of the financial 
crisis. As many people are disappointed about how big business has been done for quite some 
time, pro-social behavior and business ethics of firms could become an even bigger issue for 
consumers, investors and regulators. Managers are likely to be responsive to those demands 
“focusing on a wider concept of entrepreneurial profit with a long term view and giving the 
proper importance to stakeholders” (Fernandez-FeijooSouto, 2009, p. 41). Although, 
inferential analysis is still lacking, surveys amongst senior decision makers (Harwood et al., 
2011) as well as media analysis of the media discourse (Ellis and Bastin, 2011) has proven 
corporate social responsibility to be quite resilient.  
 Given the aforementioned literature, we posit the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a linear and positive effect of the Corporate Social Responsibility 
performance on Corporate Financial Performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a linear and positive effect of the Environmental performance on 
Corporate Financial Performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a linear and positive effect of the Social performance on Corporate 
Financial Performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a linear and positive effect of the Governance performance on 
Corporate Financial Performance. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The positive effects of total CSR performance, as well as, the Environment, 
Social and Governance performances on Corporate Financial Performance are not linear. 
 
3. Data Description and Methodology 
3.1. Data description 
 This paper investigates the effects of corporate social performance (CSP) on corporate 
financial performance (CFP) taking into account both linear and non-linear relationships. The 
sample consists of annual data for all firms listed in the S&P500 stock market index during 
the period 2007-2011 and all data used are obtained from Bloomberg.  
 More specifically, we use two ratios to access the firms’ financial performance, based 
on accounting measures, namely Return on Assets (RoA) and Return on Capital (RoC). In 
addition, we use annual excess stock returns (Ex. Stock Returns) as a measure of market-
based firms’ financial performance. CSR performance, which is the key independent 
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variable, is approximated by the Bloomberg’s ESG Disclosure score, which is based on 
publicly available company material and covers a wide range of data from CO2 emissions to 
the share of women on the board (Bloomberg, 2013, p. 16). 4  The scoring system ranges 
from full disclosure with a score of 100 to null disclosure with a score of 0 and is therefore a 
measure of breadth of reporting. (See also Eccles et al., 2011). The ESG score can be directly 
squared in order to be used in a non-linear setting, as opposed to the KLD score, which 
ranges from -2 to +2 and thus it requires some normalisation (see, for instance, Barnett and 
Salomon, 2012). 
 Apart from the ESG Disclosure score, we also consider firms’ leverage ratio (which 
serves as a proxy for Risk), sales revenue (Sales) and research & development expenditure 
(R&D). The leverage ratio, sales revenue and research &development expenditure, serve as 
control variables. The choice of the control variables can be justified by recent studies that 
find firm size (turnover), risk (measured by the total debt to total assets ratio) and research 
and development expenditure to be essential control variables when assessing the effects of 
CSP on CFP (Anderson and Dejoy, 2011; Margolis et al., 2009; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000). Finally, we include a dummy variable (Crisis), which takes the value of 1 during the 
Great Recession period (i.e. 2007-2009) and zero otherwise.  
 Given that CSR is a multidimensional concept and effects of one dimension 
sometimes cancels out opposing effects of another dimension, it is advantageous to have 
disaggregated data available (Margolis et al., 2009; Brammer et al., 2009). Thus, in this study 
we disaggregate the ESG Disclosure score into its three sub-components, namely, the 
environmental performance (ENV), social performance (SOC) and governance performance 
                                                
4 The Bloomberg’s ESG score by construction considers sustainability and  ethical impacts of an investment 
within a company; therefore it is directly related to spending of financial resources in specific CSR areas 
(Bloomberg, 2013). 
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(GOV).5 This disaggregation provides us with the advantage to assess which CSR component 
is the key driver for improving CFP. 
 It is worth noting that despite the aforementioned advantage of the ESG Disclosure 
score, this dataset has not been widely used in the literature, given the fact that the score is 
available since 2009 (though containing some retrospective data). Thus, our study aims to 
provide new insights regarding the effects of CSP on CFP using this new score. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of our variables, whereas Table 2 presents 
the unconditional correlations. Table 1 reveals that the ESG sub-components have some 
distinct difference. For instance, SOC score has the lowest average value, whereas the highest 
mean is observed for GOV. Furthermore, GOV is fairly stable, as this is shown by its standard 
deviation, while SOC is fairly volatile. Furthermore, another notable observation that we can 
deduce from Table 1 is the fact that the three measures of firm’s performance also provide a 
somewhat different behavior. Ex. Stock Returns exhibit the highest volatility, given its 
standard deviation, as well as, its minimum and maximum values. By contrast, RoC is the 
least volatile firm’s performance indicator. Finally, Sales and R&D also exhibit considerable 
volatility. We further notice that the RoC mean value is considerably higher compared to both 
the RoA and Ex. Stock Returns.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The unconditional correlations in Table 2 suggest that our variables are not highly 
correlated among them. The highest correlations are observed among ESG and its sub-
components, although their correlations do not raise concerns for any multicollinearity 
                                                
5 In order to avoid any confusion the ESG score considers governance performance that is related to CSR. More 
specifically Bloomberg’s ESG score by construction considers sustainability and ethical impacts of an 
investment within a company.  The governance score in particular considers CSR oriented issues such as: 
“internally developed statements of mission or values, codes of conduct, and principles relevant to economic, 
environmental, and social performance and the status of their implementation”, “externally developed 
economic, environmental, and social charters, principles, or other initiatives to which the organization 
subscribes or endorses” and “key topics and concerns that have been raised through stakeholder engagement, 
and how the organization has responded to those key topics and concerns, including through its reporting” 
(Bloomberg, 201, p74-75). 
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issues.6 An interesting observation that can be made from Table 2 is the fact that the market-
based performance indicator (Ex. Stock Returns) is marginally positively correlated with the 
accounting-based performance indicators of RoA and RoC. This suggests that excess stock 
returns are impact by other factors apart from firms’ fundamentals. Furthermore, we notice 
that ESG score, as well as, its sub-components are positively correlated with the performance 
measures. This is a first indication that higher scores may lead to better performance. In 
addition, we observe that risk is negatively correlated with all performance measures.  A final 
interesting observation from Table 2 is the fact that Sales are not positively related to RoA 
and Ex. Stock Returns. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Tables 3and 4 provide some further descriptive statistics of the ESG score, along with 
its sub-components, over the study period. From Tables 2 and 3 we observe that during the 
period 2007-2010 an upward trend is observed in the ESG score (improving from 22.3 to 
26.9), as well as, in all its sub-components. This upward trend is intercepted in 2011 for the 
ESG score and the GOV sub-component, when a small decrease is evident. The fact that the 
ESG disclosure score (and its sub-components) constantly increase over the study period 
indicates that CSR commitment is quite resilient over time. This holds even for turbulent 
times (i.e. during the Great Recession of 2007-2009), given that no sharp drop in the ESG 
score can be reported. A notable observation is that that despite the fact that the ESG score 
and the ENV and SOC sub-components exhibit a relatively high variance (as shown by the 
standard deviation values) among the S&P500 firms, this does not hold for the GOV sub-
component. This is suggestive of the fact that listed firms in the S&P500 may have different 
                                                
6 We have also tested for multicollinearity is our models using the VIF and the results suggest that our models 
do not suffer from multicollinearity. The results are available upon request.  
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agenda in terms of environmental and social performance but they share very similar 
governance performance. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
3.2. Panel regression model 
 This section describes the method used to examine the effects of CSP on CFP. More 
specifically, a panel regression model is employed for this study. Our panel regression model 
is as follows: 
'
0 1 , 2 , 3 , ,  for 1,2,...,  and 0,1,...,it i t n i t n t i ty CSR D i K n Nα β β β ε− −= + + + + = =x  (1) 
where, ,i ty  is the corporate financial performance indicator (i.e. RoA, RoC and Ex. Stock 
Returns, depending on the specification) for firm i at time t and ,i t nCSP −  is the corporate 
social responsibility score (in both contemporaneous and lagged terms), which, depending on 
the specification, is either the ESG score or its three sub-components (SOC, ENV, GOV). 
, , , ,[ & ]'i t n i t n i t n i t nRisk , Sales , R D− − − −=x is the a vector which includes the control variables in 
contemporaneous and lagged terms. 0α represents the constant term and tD  is a dummy 
which captures the effects of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 (and takes a value of 1 for the 
years 2007, 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise). The ,i tε  terms contains both the idiosyncratic 
error term ,i tu  and ic  which controls for the unobserved firm and time effects, such that
, ,i t i t iu cε = + . In our case, we use time and firm fixed effects. So, Equation 1 takes the 
following form: 
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In this paper we extend the linear relationship between CSP and CFP of Eq. 1 in order to 
incorporate a quadratic relationship, given that the aforementioned relationship may exhibit a 
U-shape.  
2 '
0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ,  for 1,2,...,  and 0,1,...,it i t n i t n i t n t i ty CSR CSR D e i K n Nα β β β β− − −= + + + + + = =x  (3) 
The results are presented in Section 4.  
 
4. Empirical Findings 
Table 5 reports the panel regression results for the effects of ESG score on CFP. 
Specifications (1)-(3) report the linear relationship between ESG and the three CFP indicators 
(RoA, RoC and Ex. Stock Returns). 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Results suggest that in linear specifications the effect of CSR performance is positive 
but insignificant for all measures of CFP. Furthermore, the lagged ESG coefficient is 
negative but not significant, as well. Therefore, we maintain that we cannot confirm 
Hypothesis 1. Overall, this result is not in line with other studies, which suggest that a 
significantly positive effect of corporate social performance on CFP (see, for instance, 
Margolis et al., 2009). Nevertheless, these results partially confirm the findings by 
Fernandez-FeijooSouto (2009) and Mittal et al. (2008), among others. 
 Furthermore, the results for the control variables are as expected. More specifically, 
CFP is significantly affected by Risk (negatively), Sales (positively) and R&D (positively). 
Intuitively, while excessive risk drives down CFP, the opposite is true for research and 
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development. The Crisis dummy coefficient is negative and significant, signifying the 
negative effect of the Great Recession on CFP. The lagged dependent variables are positive 
for RoA and RoC, whereas a negative coefficient is observed for Ex. Stock Returns. 
Potentially the latter finding captures the declining trend of stock prices during the study 
period.  
We now turn to the CSP-CFP link in quadratic models for all three performance 
indicators (see, Table 5, specifications (4)-(6)). The quadratic models reveal some rather 
interesting results. We find that for both RoA and RoC, there is a significant U-shaped CSP-
CFP relationship, whereas the effect of CSP on Ex. Stock Returns is insignificant. Intuitively, 
the negative effect of CSP on CFP in the linear model turns out to be part of a more complex 
relationship that is only revealed when testing for non-linear models. The U-shaped 
relationship discovered between CSP and accounting-based CFP measures (i.e. RoC and 
RoA) implies that investment in CSR does not pay off immediately, but rather only after a 
threshold level of CSP is reached. This finding provides evidence in favour of our Hypothesis 
5, which suggest that a non-linear relationship exists between CSP and CFP. Apparently, 
improving CSP is a costly procedure and requires a vast amount of resources in order to 
transform the supply chain of the firm (Manasakis et al., 2013; Porter and  Krammer 2011; 
Reinhard and Stavins, 2010). Given the assumption that a high CSP score is positively 
connected in undertaking costs towards this direction (Barnett and Salomon 2012, 2006), 
only a considerable amount of investment and therefore achievement regarding CSP shall 
trigger the positive consumers’ reactions which in turn will lead to a positive CSP-CFP 
relationship. Regarding the control variables, the Crisis dummy and the lagged dependent 
variables, the results for the quadratic models are similar with those of the linear models. 
We further our analysis focusing on the three sub-components of the ESG disclosure 
score. Table 6 reports the empirical findings. Once again the first three specification concern 
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the linear relationship between CFP and the three components (see, specifications (7)-(9)), 
whereas the latter three specifications focus on the quadratic relationship (i.e. (10)-(12)). 
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
The linear models do not allow us to report any significant relationship (either in the 
contemporaneous or lagged terms) between CFP and the three sub-components (i.e., ENV, 
SOC and GOV), suggesting that Hypotheses 2-4 cannot be confirmed. In addition, we include 
two interaction terms that allows us to capture whether GOV may indirectly impact firm 
performance via the ENV and SOC activities. Nevertheless, we cannot find any significant 
relationship suggesting that GOV does not have any direct or indirect effects on firm 
performance. Furthermore, we observe that both the signs and the significance of the control 
variables coefficients, the Crisis dummy coefficient and the lagged dependent variables are 
similar with Table 5.  
However, turning to the quadratic models, the GOV score can be identified as the 
main driver of the relationship observed in Table 5, specifications (4)-(6). To elaborate 
further, we observe that for all accounting-based measures of CFP (i.e. RoC and RoA) one 
can detect a U-shaped relationship between the GOV score and CFP, providing further 
evidence in favour of Hypothesis 5. This result is in line with a recent strand in the literature, 
which suggests that strategic investment in CSR-oriented governance structures shall 
improve the overall financial performance of the firm.  
To elaborate further, the rationale behind the contribution of the GOV score to firm’s 
CFP can be explained by using Stakeholder Influence Capacity (SIC) as introduced by 
Barnett (2007) via both supply and demand analysis. First, regarding the supply side, a CSR 
oriented governance structure affects the operation of the firm towards CSR oriented 
activities, including environmental and social related activities. Consequently, it allows for 
targeted CSR activities throughout the value chain of the firm that can also serve the “shared 
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value” (Porter and Kramer, 2011, p.4) approach to CSR and therefore the financial 
performance of the firm (see, inter alia, McWilliams and Siegel, 2011; Bagnoli and Watts, 
2003; Baron, 2001). In addition, CSR activities that belong to the SOC score are often related 
to lump sum payments connected to “corporate philanthropy” which in turn may not affect 
the financial performance of the firms (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Second, on the demand 
side, CSR-oriented governance acts as a credible signal for long run commitment to CSR 
values. This enhances the positive demand effects from socially conscious consumers and 
therefore the financial performance of the firm (See for instance, Lambertini, L. and 
Tampieri, 2015; Becchetti et al. 2014; Manasakis et al., 2014; Kopel and Brand, 2012). 
Interestingly enough, we cannot report any link between CSP and Ex. Stock Returns. 
This can be explained by the fact that tests based on excess stock market returns might be 
rather weak if CSR policies change only slightly over time (Gregory and Whittaker, 
2013).The fact that CSP exercises an impact on accounting-based measures of CFP but not 
on Ex. Stock Returns may suggests that there is a positive demand effect from CSR activities 
on firms’ revenues. Nevertheless, this effect may not be translated into higher excess stock 
returns, given that stock returns are affected by multiple other factors, as well. 
Finally, when it comes to control variables, Risk and R&D expenditure have a 
significant effect; although not in the same direction (i.e. risk once again is reported to 
exercise a negative effect on CFP, whereas the reverse effect is exercised by R&D 
expenditure). Overall, the signs of the coefficients remain unchanged, regardless the 
specification. Once again, the Crisis dummy variable is negative and significant.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
The present paper investigates relationship between corporate social performance and 
corporate financial performance, making use of a new CSR proxy, the Bloomberg ESG 
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Disclosure score. In addition, we also consider the three sub-components of the ESG score 
(i.e. ENV, SOC and GOV). We measure CFP using two accounting-based measures, i.e. RoC 
and RoA, as well as, a market-based measure, that of Ex. Stock Returns. Our control variables 
include Sales, Risk and R&D expenditure. Our sample includes all firms that are listed in the 
S&P500 stock market index. Annual data are considered for the period of 2007 to 2011.  
Results from the linear model suggest that no significant relationships can be reported 
between CSP and RoA, RoC and Ex. Stock Returns. Notably, our analysis provides evidence 
of a U-shaped relationship between CSR performance and accounting-based CFP. This 
relationship implies that CSR pays off only after a certain threshold amount of investments 
and achievements regarding CSP have been made. Before this point is reached, additional 
CSR expenditures decrease CFP. Most prominent among our results is the fact that when we 
disaggregate the composite CSR score into its three sub-components we find that the 
governance sub-component is the main mechanism by which CSR commitment is translated 
into improved CFP. This result adds on the discussion regarding the StakeholderInfluence 
Capacity and confirms recent advances in theoretical literature which suggest that CSR 
oriented governance leads to positive effects on CFP. 
Overall, companies use CSR as a part of their strategic planning in order to create 
additional value for their product. Effective CSR strategies can attract stakeholders, such as 
socially conscious consumers and investors, to increase their willingness to buy and invest, 
respectively. An immediate managerial implication of our findings suggests that in order for 
CSR to serve the interests of the shareholders a long-run planning and considerable resources 
should be dedicated at this direction, given that CSR expenditure does not pay off 
immediately, but only after a threshold of CSP has been reached. Furthermore, the fact that 
governance is the key driver affecting the CSP-CFP relationship suggests that CSR 
investments should be directed to this component. CSR dedicated governance can benefit the 
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firm by both integrating CSR activities into firm’s value chain in the direction of value 
creation and by acting as a signaling device to stakeholders regarding the commitment of the 
firm to CSR. 
One of the main limitations of this study is that the ESG score does not take into 
account the kind of CSR a firm engages in. As Baron (2001) outlined in theory and Hillman 
and Keim (2001) confirmed empirically, different types of CSR (altruistic vs. strategic CSR) 
can have a very different effect on profitability. When those two different types of CSR are 
aggregated into one single score, the respective effects might cancel each other out 
understating the actual effect. Nevertheless, such drawback is shared with many other 
measurements of corporate social responsibility. 
An interesting avenue for further research is the examination of the effects of ESG 
scores for other firms, such firms listed in Europe or Asia (in order to account for the effects 
of different regulatory frameworks) or among different industrial sectors, which will allow 
for fruitful comparisons. Furthermore, it would be interesting for future research to examine 
the direction of causality between CSP and CFP. Future work could also investigate the CSP-
CFP relationship using time-varying measures in order to examine its dynamic 
character.Finally, replicating the results using the KLD data would be a worthwhile 
consideration in order to establish the amount of variance in the results that is due to the 
different measures of CSR. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables under investigation. The 
sample period runs from 2007-2011. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
ESG 2365 25.161 14.032 6.198 85.123 
ENV 1432 23.976 17.131 0.775 89.922 
SOC 2346 19.161 17.622 3.125 83.333 
GOV 2364 55.117 6.132 17.857 85.714 
RoA 2448 6.639 8.122 -68.615 46.705 
RoC 2149 13.976 14.641 -107.571 250.897 
Ex. Stock 
Returns 2331 6.553 48.216 -97.397 792.363 
Risk 2465 23.869 17.701 0.000 156.235 
Sales 2479 18096.8 35022.771 72.041 433526.000 
R&D 1426 612.137 1336.132 0.000 10991.000 
Note: The variables are ESG = ESG disclosure score, ENV = environmental 
disclosure score, SOC = social disclosure score, GOV = governmental disclosure 
score, RoA = return on assets, RoC = return on capital, Ex. Stock Returns = excess 
stock market returns, Risk = leverage (as proxy for risk), Sales = sales revenue, R&D 
= Research & Development expenditure. 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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 Table 2: Unconditional correlations of the variables under investigation. The sample period runs from 2007-2011. 
 
RoA RoC 
Ex. Stock 
Returns ESG ENV SOC GOV Risk Sales R&D 
RoA 1.0000 
         RoC 0.7452 1.0000 
        Ex. Stock Returns 0.0190 0.03-2 1.0000 
       ESG 0.1056 0.0806 0.0136 1.0000 
      ENV 0.0877 0.0462 0.0288 0.9970 1.0000 
     SOC 0.1045 0.1520 0.0186 0.9001 0.6956 1.0000 
    GOV 0.1593 0.0462 -0.0049 0.7858 0.6116 0.6056 1.0000 
   Risk -0.0941 -0.1656 -0.0157 0.2540 0.2367 0.2296 0.2730 1.0000 
  Sales -0.0868 0.0144 -0.0502 -0.0556 -0.0926 0.0367 -0.0427 -0.1586 1.0000 
 R&D 0.3035 0.1576 -0.0324 0.2947 0.2806 0.2894 0.2094 -0.1900 0.3793 1.0000 
 Note: The variables are ESG = ESG disclosure score, ENV = environmental disclosure score, SOC = social disclosure score, GOV = 
governmental disclosure score, RoA = return on assets, RoC = return on capital, Ex. Stock Returns = excess stock market returns, Risk = 
leverage as proxy for risk, Sales = sales revenue, R&D = Research & Development expenditure. 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Table 3. ESG Disclosure Score. The sample period runs from 2007-
2011. 
Year Obs Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
2007 428 22.315 11.820 6.198 61.157 
2008 479 23.749 12.972 8.612 67.543 
2009 486 25.661 14.643 9.504 78.099 
2010 490 26.924 14.407 8.677 77.593 
2011 482 26.796 15.295 7.851 85.123 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Table 4. ENV, SOC and GOV Disclosure Score. The sample period runs 
from 2007-2011. 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
ENV 2007 229 20.811 14.741 0.775 61.607 
ENV 2008 280 22.159 15.999 0.775 66.666 
ENV 2009 288 25.943 17.722 0.775 78.512 
ENV 2010 325 24.827 17.219 0.775 78.512 
ENV 2011 310 25.239 18.668 1.379 89.922 
SOC 2007 426 15.686 15.689 3.125 68.750 
SOC 2008 478 17.060 16.712 3.125 73.438 
SOC 2009 484 19.326 18.044 3.125 82.456 
SOC 2010 484 21.539 17.801 3.125 81.250 
SOC 2011 474 21.808 18.776 3.125 83.333 
GOV 2007 428 54.064 5.453 21.429 75.000 
GOV 2008 479 54.585 5.715 23.214 76.786 
GOV 2009 486 55.159 6.192 17.857 82.142 
GOV 2010 489 55.893 6.390 33.929 82.143 
GOV 2011 482 55.754 6.596 33.929 85.714 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Table 5. CSP-CFP Relationship in Linear and Quadratic Models (ESG Composite Score). The 
sample period runs from 2007-2011. 
Independent
Variable 
(1) 
RoA 
(2) 
RoC 
(3) 
Ex. Stock 
Returns 
(4) 
RoA 
(5) 
RoC 
(6) 
Ex. Stock 
Returns 
ESGt  0.0171 (0.600)   
 0.0424 
(0.348)  
-0.0780 
 (0.702)  
  -0.0208*  
 (0.082)  
 -0.0294** 
 (0.028) 
-0.356 
 (0.569)    
ESG t 2 
   
 0.0042* 
 (0.097) 
 0.00102* 
(0.070) 
 0.00424  
 (0.612) 
Riskt  -0.232*** 
(0.000) 
-0.141*** 
(0.000)  
-1.362*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.232*** 
(0.000) 
-0.140*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.354*** 
(0.000) 
Salest 0.000040* 
 (0.069)  
0.000092*** 
 (0.003) 
-0.000044 
 (0.748)  
 
0.000040* 
(0.069) 
0.000092*** 
(0.003) 
 
-0.0000450 
 (0.740) 
R&Dt -0.00069 
 (0.354) 
0.00231** 
 (0.032)  
0.0157*** 
 (0.001) 
0.00073 
  (0.322) 
 0.00232** 
(0.031)   
0.0159*** 
 (0.001) 
Crisis t -2.562*** 
(0.000) 
-1.850*** 
(0.004) 
-13.82*** 
(0.000) 
-2.561*** 
(0.000) 
 -1.856*** 
(0.004) 
 -13.86*** 
(0.000) 
RoAt-1  0.486*** 
(0.000)   
 0.485*** 
(0.000)   
RoCt-1  
 0.604*** 
(0.000)   
 0.603***  
(0.000)  
ExReturns t-1   
-0.241*** 
(0.000)   
-0.241*** 
(0.000) 
ESG t-1 -0.0243 
(0.488)  
-0.0593 
(0.223) 
 -0.0152 
(0.945)    
Constant  6.464*** 
(0.000) 
 7.990*** 
(0.000) 
24.19*** 
(0.000) 
7.813*** 
(0.000) 
 8.494*** 
(0.000) 
 31.42*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 1016 806 952 1016 806 952 
R-Squared 0.3538  0.6042 0.1066  0.3551  0.6043   0.1086  
Note: The variables are ESG = ESG disclosure score, RoA = return on assets, RoC = return on capital, Ex. Stock 
Returns = excess stock market returns, Risk = leverage as proxy for risk, Sales = sales revenue, R&D = Research & 
Development expenditure, Crisis = dummy variable for financial crisis. 
P-values in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Data source: Bloomberg 
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Table 6. CSP-CFP Relationship in Linear and Quadratic Models (ESG sub-components scores). 
The sample period runs from 2007-2011. 
Independent 
Variable 
(7) 
RoA 
(8) 
RoC 
(9) 
Ex. Stock 
Returns 
(10) 
RoA 
(11) 
RoC 
(12) 
Ex. Stock 
Returns 
ENV t  0.0176 
 (0.931) 
0.229 
(0.395) 
 0.0696 
(0.961) 
 -0.00512 
 (0.934) 
0.101 
 (0.224)  
-0.679 
 (0.113) 
ENV t 2 
   
 -0.000106 
 (0.902)  
 
-0.00106  
(0.345) 
 0.0102*   
 (0.085)  
SOC t  0.0623  
 (0.773)  
-0.223  
(0.449) 
 -0.240 
 (0.874) 
 -0.0249 
 (0.716) 
 0.0681 
 (0.459) 
-0.0533 
 (0.911) 
SOC t 2  
   
 0.000356  
 (0.694) 
 -0.00116 
 (0.325) 
 -0.00104 
 (0.869) 
GOV t  0.122 
(0.326) 
  0.0238 
 (0.885) 
 0.217 
(0.811) 
 -0.224* 
(0.099)  
 -1.622** 
 (0.031) 
 2.103 
 (0.599) 
GOV t 2 
   
  0.00232**  
 (0.019) 
 0.0136** 
 (0.026) 
 -0.0161 
 (0.618)    
GOVxENV t -0.000403 
 (0.906) 
-0.00319 
 (0.476) 
 -0.00138 
(0.954)    
GOVxSOC t  -0.00109 
  (0.765) 
 0.00356 
 (0.469) 
 0.00196 
(0.939)    
Riskt -0.428*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.345*** 
(0.000) 
-1.778*** 
(0.000) 
-0.420*** 
(0.000) 
-0.345*** 
 (0.000) 
-1.741*** 
(0.000) 
Salest 0.00003* 
 (0.061) 
0.00008*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.000009 
 (0.943) 
0.00003* 
(0.055) 
0.00008*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.00001  
 (0.897) 
R&Dt 0.00007  
(0.911) 
0.00180* 
(0.050) 
0.0147*** 
(0.001)  
0.00002 
(0.976) 
 0.00169* 
 (0.065) 
0.0150*** 
(0.001)    
Crisist  -1.928*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.812 
 (0.241) 
-8.218**  
(0.031) 
 -1.950*** 
  (0.000) 
 -0.864 
(0.210) 
 -8.281** 
(0.029) 
RoA t-1   0.459*** 
(0.000)   
  0.459*** 
(0.000)   
RoC t-1    0.505*** (0.000)    
  0.505*** 
(0.000)   
Ex. Stock 
Returns t-1   
 -0.199*** 
(0.000)   
 -0.199*** 
(0.000) 
30 
ENV t-1  -0.163  
 (0.434) 
 -0.422  
 (0.123) 
 -1.559 
 (0.305)    
SOC t-1  -0.138  
 (0.520) 
 0.312  
 (0.278) 
 0.684 
(0.646)    
GOV t-1  -0.208* 
  (0.070) 
 -0.117 
 (0.432) 
-0.388 
 (0.676)    
GOVxENV t-1 0.00287 
(0.414) 
0.00643 
 (0.159) 
 0.0291 
 (0.255)     
GOVxSOC t-1  0.00234 
(0.521)  
-0.00475 
 (0.328) 
 -0.0138  
 (0.586)    
Constant 11.07* 
  (0.079) 
 14.27* 
(0.093) 
 24.94 
 (0.586) 
 13.16  
 (0.453) 
58.87** 
(0.010) 
-56.89 
(0.639) 
Observations 611 494 574 611 494 574 
R-Squared  0.3689 0.4905 0.1243 0.3657 0.4929  0.1267  
Note: The variables are ENV = environmental disclosure score, SOC = social disclosure score, GOV = 
governmental disclosure score, RoA = return on assets, RoC = return on capital, Ex. Stock Returns = 
excess stock market returns, Risk = leverage as proxy for risk, Sales = sales revenue, R&D = Research 
& Development expenditure, Crisis = dummy variable for financial crisis 
p-values in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Data source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
